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ABSTRACT
The first part presented a philosophical staircase that can guide IS
practitioners in identifying the various validity claims raised by any project of
information systems definition, design, and development (ISD). It was concluded
that the discursive principle is constitutive of every step in this staircase but
requires pragmatization. The present second part of the paper begins with a
short review of the way in which the discursive principle has been considered in
the ISD literature thus far. It then introduces the second main pillar of the
suggested approach to reflective practice in ISD, critically systemic discourse.
The methodological core concept of critically systemic discourse is boundary
critique, a concept based in the author’s work on critical systems heuristics and
critical systems thinking. Based on this core concept and a practical application,
a three-stage model for reflective practice in ISD is suggested.
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THE DISCURSIVE PRINCIPLE IN
THE ISD LITERATURE

Despite the constitutive character of the
discursive principle for the validity claims
involved in ISD, relatively few authors have
systematically considered its implications for
the design and use of information systems. On
the other hand, I find it interesting and
encouraging indeed that those attempts of
which I am aware have come to conclusions
that I can easily relate to a discursive
understanding of our philosophical staircase as
I have suggested it in the last Section of Part 2.
I would like to refer the reader particularly to
three contributions by Lyytinen and
Hirschheim (1986), Nissen (1989), and

Hirschheim, Klein and Lyytinen (1996). A
brief review of these contributions in the light
of the present paper appears useful to further
illustrate its implications and hopefully to
concretize some of the challenges on the way
ahead.
Lyytinen and Hirschheim (1986): “IS
as rational discourse.” These two authors
were among the first to analyze the use of
information systems in the light of Habermas’
theory of communicative action. This effort
made them recognize that the prevailing
description of information systems in technical
terms tends to prevent us from fully
appreciating their social nature. They refer to
communicative practices in organizations
which “impose constraints on people’s
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behavior but which can also be transformed by
knowledgeable social actors” (1986, p. 20).
The formal and institutionalized nature of IS
creates obstacles to such transformations (an
observation that fits in nicely with the example
of hospital information systems considered at
the end of Part 1) Lyytinen and Hirschheim are
equally concerned about the fact that
“information systems cannot be dissociated
from social power as a capacity for getting
things done.” (1986, p. 23) As a consequence
of these circumstances they diagnose serious
“barriers to the use of IS as a discourse” (1988,
p. 23f):
The formal nature of communication via an
information system … does not fulfill one
of the ground rules for a discourse: the
chance to express opinions through
argumentation. The institutionalization
denies another rule (full symmetry in
participation). Finally, the use of IS in
organizations does not usually test
participants’ opinions as discourse does
(except perhaps teleconferencing). Instead,
information systems compel their users to
act, thus producing particular social
relations across time and space. (Lyytinen
and Hirschheim 1988, p. 24)

In these barriers they suspect the reason
why hardly any IS definition thus far has been
based on a discursive concept of action. I
understand their paper as an effort to
demonstrate how the use of information
systems can overcome these barriers.
Basically, the authors see two possibilities
(1986, p. 24f, italics are mine): IS can serve as
“a means of discourse,” that is, provide by
themselves discursive opportunities; or IS can
be of “use in discourse,” that is, serve as a
means for supporting discourses that are going
on in their environment independently of their
existence.
Information systems may provide
discursive opportunities in three ways (1988,
p. 24f):
1.

They can establish new channels of
communication among people across
conventional hierarchic and spatial
barriers.

2.

They can render social relationships
among those involved more symmetrical,
thereby redistributing the social or
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organizational positions and skills that
provide access to information and also
allow those who have access to question
the
rationality
of
prevailing
interpretations.
3.

They can produce new information that
calls for a critical review of dominant
practices and policies and for validating
the underlying organizational or social
norms and values; at the same time, such
new information can support local
discourses within the organizational or
social
environment
concerned
in
criticizing and transforming the practices
in question.

Information systems may support
ongoing discourses in two ways (1988, pp. 2527):
1.

The may provide information that can be
used as data (in Toulmin’s sense of
evidence) or warrant to support
argumentation. (The reader may wish to
add backings, too.)

2.

As an indirect consequence of learning to
use information systems according to
Toulmin’s structure of argumentation,
users may also begin to understand
information in terms of speech act theory
(as communicative or discursive action)
rather than in the usual informationtheoretic terms (as a reduction of
uncertainty) and consequently improve
their communicative practices.

In
conclusion,
Lyytinen
and
Hirschheim (1988, p. 28) postulate that ISD
should give more attention to three
implications of seeing information systems as
related to discourse:
(i) Information systems should facilitate
discursive action by the users.
(ii) ISD methodologies should provide
“institutional
arrangements
that
approximate the ground rules of rational
discourse.” (It remains unclear whether
they mean to request this for ISD
methodologies only or also for the
resulting IS.)
(iii) The implementation of information
systems and their acceptance by the users
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should be seen as an issue of creating
legitimacy with respect to the four validity
claims
involved,
comprehensibility,
truthfulness, truth, and rightness.
Nissen (1989): ISD for responsible
actors. Nissen’s basic concern is that IS users
should “understand how others try to influence
them through this medium,” and his central
question therefore is: “How can information
systems be developed supporting responsible
action?” (1989, p. 99) Actors act responsibly,
according to Nissen, if they consider the way
an action may affect other people and also
question its underpinning notion of human
progress. Nissen speaks of actors rather than
“users” to emphasize the irreducible autonomy
and responsibility of IS users with respect to
their use of “information.” For instance, acting
rather than merely using an IS implies some
responsibility of informing oneself and
learning not only through the institutionalized
IS itself but also through self-selected sources,
in particular through direct interaction with
people who can offer alternative and
independent information. This is so important
because IS ought to be looked at as
representing “a special case of institutionalized
argumentation” (1989, p. 101): they have been
modeled so as to influence users in their ways
of handling a certain context of decisionmaking and argumentation, typically a context
related to work in an organization.
Computerized information systems try to
achieve this by means of embedded dataprocessing systems; Nissen calls them “data
systems” as distinguished from “information
systems.” Data systems “represent an extreme
form of institutionalization” (1989, p. 107), for
they need to model both the argumentation
structure and the context of interest in a way
that is “closed.” (1989, p. 111) That is to say,
the system is insensitive to a broader social
and historical context of action and to the ways
in which this context may evolve over time; it
can acquire no additional knowledge of the
context and of the sources of evidence,
warrants, and backings or of possible rebuttals
but must take all this for granted. Furthermore,
the rigid deductive-logical and numerical
argumentation structure built into data systems
does not exhaust all forms of relevant and
sensible human argumentation, as it has no

way of assessing arguments or actions in terms
of values (1989, p. 104). The “argumentation
metaphor” thus points to a fundamental
difference between data systems and
information systems, one that no development
of data-processing methods and technology
will ever eliminate (1989, p. 106f).
Accordingly, Nissen concludes,
No attempts should be made to substitute
an information system 100 per cent by data
systems. This would deprive actors and
people affected of checking the claims
produced and thereby of their rights to act
responsibly. Further large parts of the data
systems would have to be designed to meet
very infrequent events. (1989, p. 107)

In order to demystify the way
information systems work, Nissen translates
his argumentation metaphor into a simple
graphic “argumentation model” for IS use and
development. The graphic shows data systems
as an embedded part of an information system
and this as an embedded part of “work in a
field of action,” which I understand as an
organizational context of work and interaction.
All three systems depend for their functioning
on the action and interaction of people
(informers and actors). Interaction of
responsible actors always implies the use of
information and argumentation in a way that is
independent of the institutionalized systems;
the structure of argumentation is understood
according to Toulmin’s (1962) model. The
three systems differ in the way the
underpinning argumentative structure is built
into them; while in data systems it is rigid and
closed, in information systems – properly seen
in their organizational context of work and
interaction – it is open in the sense that
Actors, their informers, and people affected
will always have to argue with each other
outside all data systems available for this
purpose. New methods and technology only
move the boundary between data systems
and other parts of an information system,
never eliminate them. (1989, p. 107).

Likewise, all conceivable developments
of information systems can only expand the
boundary between the institutionalized system
and the field of action of which it is a part;
they should never make us forget this
boundary. Nor should they make IS designers
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assume the main problem is to redesign
embedded data systems so as to extend their
range of application: “Learning and resocialization dominates the evolution of these
other parts, not redesign of data system.”
(1989, p. 107).
Responsible actors will therefore never
exclusively rely on this institutionalized form
of argumentation; to the extent they do rely on
it, they will demand the best evidence, warrant
and backing for an “information” before
accepting it as a valid claim for action. That
means for IS designers and developers that a
good information system should help actors to
assess and question this implicit claim for
action in every concrete application, for
instance by suggesting context-related
questions, by qualifying the validity of
information with respect to their suggested
argumentative force (qualifying expressions
for data and warrants), or by offering
conceivable rebuttals in the form of counterevidence or alternative warrants and backings
that might capture aspects of the specific
context (1989, p. 107 and p.110).
Much better than working toward the
mistaken ideal of substituting an information
system by automated data systems – an ideal
that means to “deprive actors and people
affected of [the possibility of] checking the
claims produced and thereby of their rights to
act responsibly” – ISD should seek to “exploit
the interactiveness of today’s computers”; this
promises to be “not only more ethical but also
more profitable” (1989, p. 107). Since
responsible action involves resolving conflicts,
ISD should learn to conceive of IS as
“judgment based information systems, i.e.,
information systems in which there are actors
striving to act responsibly.” (1989, p. 110).
Finally, the model implies that the process of
IS development itself “could be looked upon
as a discourse about how the current way of
institutionalized argumentation may be
redesigned” (1989, p. 105).
Hirschheim, Klein and Lyytinen
(1996): ISD as “rational argumentation
design” and “institutional democracy
design.” This paper offers a comprehensive
review of the diversity of IS development
strategies that one can find in different schools
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of IS research as seen through an actiontheoretic framework which, the authors claim,
explains the “intellectual structures of ISD”
and offers a pluralist conception of IS as an
academic discipline (1996, p. 4). Based on
Habermas’ (1984) theory of communicative
action as well as Etzioni’s (1968) social
theory, the authors devise a classification
scheme for interpreting and relating the many
different research orientations in the field.
They follow (more or less) Habermas in
distinguishing between four orientations in
ISD change through which systems developers
can approach ISD: an instrumental, strategic,
communicative or discursive orientation. The
first two orientations look at IS primarily as a
means of “control”; the third orientation looks
at IS as a means for creating shared meanings
through “sense-making,” and the fourth as a
means for clarifying or justifying claims
through “argumentation.” (1996, pp. 10-12)
The authors then follow Etzioni in
distinguishing between three principal domains
of ISD change on which IS researchers may
focus:
“technology,”
“language,”
or
“organization.” The first domain focuses on
hard- and software development and considers
the fact that new technology is often the
driving force in IS change. The second domain
focuses on the fact that IS influence, and are
influenced by, patterns of “socially organized
human behavior” such as work arrangements
and procedures, roles and positions of actors.
The third domain, finally, focuses on the fact
that IS define forms and contents of
communication in organizations and hence,
chances for reaching common understanding
about conditions and goals of action. (1996,
pp. 12-16)
The two dimensions combine to a grid
of twelve classes or “change frames” for ISD.
Three of these are vacant since a focus on
technology as the primary domain of change
combines with an instrumental action
orientation only; the other two domains of
change combine with each of the four action
orientations. The framework thus serves to
identify nine development strategies (1996, p.
17f). I will limit my account to the discursive
orientation. Combined with a focus on
language (speech acts) as the primary domain
of change, it yields an IS development strategy
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called “systems for rational argumentation” or
rational argumentation design; combined with
a focus on organization as domain of change, it
yields a strategy called “systems for
institutionalized checks and balances” or
institutional democracy design (1996, p. 17).
Designing
systems
for
rational
argumentation is a strategy that once again
draws on Toulmin’s pragmatic logic of
argumentation and tries to design information
systems so that they do justice to it and
consequently
can
support
rational
argumentation by users:
•

•

The basic idea is warrant design (1996, p.
41), a concern that has received increasing
attention since Churchman’s (1971)
seminal discussion of the problem of how
an information system can guarantee the
validity of its results. Ideally the system
design would include all the warrants
(inference rules and backings) needed for
deriving the results from some evidence
(data). However, at latest since
Churchman has analyzed the problem in
the light of alternative theories of
knowledge, we know there is no
epistemological basis for complete
warrant design – no conceivable design
for an information system can serve as its
own guarantor (Ulrich 1985, p. 874).
To the extent that warrant design must
remain incomplete, the next best option is
building in some cross checking ability
(1996, p. 21). Once again the basic idea is
that the system should allow users to
understand and assess the information it
provides by disclosing both the evidence
and the warrants it uses. This puts users in
a situation where they can either feed in
independent evidence or modify the logic
by changing warrants. The main approach
is thus (in my own terms) to promote
independent argumentation by system
users through a meta-level discursive
process, or in the terms of the authors, “to
design systems that generate information
to directly support the structure of
arguments and counter arguments.” (1996,
p. 41) A complementary ideal is seen by
the authors in Goldkuhl’s (1991)

requirement of transparency for design
decisions in the ISD process.
•

A third basic idea proposed by the authors
is a critical audit approach of IS designers
with respect to all validity claims implied
by a specific system design, particularly
concerning the trustworthiness of the
system’s internal design and operations
(1996, p. 39f).

•

Finally, the authors recognize that this
development
strategy
of
rational
argumentation design implies renouncing
the idea that knowledge can be adequately
represented by formal structures of
predicate logic or some other “monological” structure (1996, p. 42).

Designing systems for institutionalized
checks and balances, the second strategy for
pursuing a discursive orientation, goes beyond
rational argumentation design in that it
considers the distorting effects of hierarchy
and other sources of asymmetries of influence
and power in organizations. It is therefore
oriented to eliminating or neutralizing such
effects through institutionalized checks and
balances. It sees information systems as
vehicles for improving organizational or social
conditions for rational argumentation:
•

The basic idea is to design information
systems so that they help to foster and
sustain a competitive market of ideas. Two
possible metaphors for conceiving of this
idea are IS as “public media” that provide
for openness and diversity of information,
along with principles of free speech and
equal access; or IS as a “court of justice”
which allows different actors to argue
their case with opposing evidence. (1996,
p. 21)

•

ISD might aim “to introduce channels for
cross-checking data and claims, introduce
checks and balances against subconscious
bias and self-deception, and to reduce
defensiveness and other psychological
barriers to free inquiry, e.g. double-loop
learning” (1996, p. 42, with reference to
Argyris and Schön 1978). Such measures
are intended to help approximate, however
imperfectly, the presuppositions of an
ideal speech situation.
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•

Ideas such as “due process,” equal
availability
of
information,
equal
obligation and opportunity to defend one’s
argument, peer review, independent
outside
reviews,
transparency
of
normative issues, widest possible debate
of
issues
including
stakeholder
involvement and (where indicated) citizen
participation, as well as a strong role of
the public media, are among the ideas
further mentioned by the authors in this
context; the common concern is to enable
and support critical thinking. (1996, p. 25
and 42f).

•

Finally, the authors also refer to my own
critical systems heuristics and its
“evaluation of boundary judgments (i.e.
how to identify and design for the ‘limits’
of the design)” as a strategy for
institutional democracy design (1996, p.
43). This conforms to the basic
emancipatory concern of my approach in
promoting more “symmetry of critical
competence” among social actors (see,
e.g., Ulrich 1993, p. 604f, and 2000a, p.
259); however, classifying critical
heuristics as an approach to institutional
democracy design risks creating a
misunderstanding concerning its aims. I
would like to point out that critical
heuristics aims to promote chances for
mutual understanding and compelling
argumentation in general, on the part of
citizens as much as professionals, by
opening up potentials of cogent critique
with respect to both the theoretical and the
practical dimension of reason, in a way
that does not depend on any specific
expertise nor specific institutional
requirements. Insofar I would say that
critical heuristics is as much a conceptual
tool for “rational argumentation design” as
for “institutional democracy design.” The
remainder of the present paper will be
dedicated to an outline and illustration of
this approach. I would like to explore its
potential of supporting critical reflection
and discourse about the design and use of
information systems along the lines of our
philosophical staircase.

Conclusion. In my judgment, we can
hardly overestimate the importance of the
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discursive principle for the future of ISD. The
idea that information systems represent a kind
of “frozen” argumentative structure that users
as well as other concerned parties need to
“unfreeze” to make proper use of them, is
compelling and can inspire new directions of
IS research. Yet, the fact is that progress along
these lines has been slow and (as far as I can
see) has remained a rather marginal concern of
IS professionals. One major reason that I see is
that the correspondence theory of truth,
according to which proper information and
valid knowledge is “what corresponds to the
facts,” is still so firmly entrenched among
professionals as well as lay people. A second,
related reason may be that the idea of
discursive rationality – discursive examination
of validity claims – is still relatively new and
will take time to overcome the prevailing
confusion of applied science with practical
rationality. However, I suspect that the most
serious difficulty is the “utopian” character of
the discursive principle. Discourse, as we have
seen, can establish claims to relevant
information, valid knowledge, and rational
action only under ideal conditions, and even
then only if it can continue until consensus is
reached by no other means than
argumentation. The discursive principle of
validation is an ideal, no less than any other
approach to rational practice.
The conclusion is inevitable: if the
discursive principle is to gain a major role, it
can only be if we succeed in pragmatizing it in
a critically tenable way. This is the aim of the
critical turn1 that I advocate. Applied to the
discursive principle, it means that we might do
well to understand discourse as a means of
critique only, rather than understanding it as a
device that aims at validation. This does not
throw the ideal of sufficient justification over
board but rather understands it as a critical
principle only, a principle that requires a
systematic effort of uncovering the inevitable
justification deficits of all ISD practice. Let us
then turn to this issue of a critical turn of our
understanding of discursive practice and see in
what way it may help us in promoting
reflective practice in ISD.

1

Compare note 1 and 4 in Part 1 (pp. 55 and 74).
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CRITICALLY SYSTEMIC
DISCOURSE: TOWARD
REFLECTIVE PRACTICE IN ISD

Barriers to rational discourse. The
basic idea of our approach to promoting
reflective practice in the design and use of IS
should be clear: designing, using and
developing information systems entails a
multitude of assumptions2 and corresponding
validity claims. The philosophical staircase
represents an attempt to arrange these
assumptions and claims according to nine
fundamental issues. It offers a systematic
order for examining these issues, in the sense
that each subsequent step presupposes all
previous steps. Sometimes a step will raise
questions that prompt us to go back to previous
steps and review pertinent assumptions, but
basically the staircase guides us in proceeding
from the lowest to the highest step. The
methodological device for taking each step is
discourse. Each step requires a discursive

2

By assumptions, I mean any kind of
presuppositions that underlie a concrete systems
definition or design, whether deliberately so or not.
In particular, they include not only empirical
assumptions regarding relevant circumstances
(“facts”, “evidence” to be considered or left out) but
also normative assumptions regarding appropriate
value judgements (norms; on the meaning of
“normative” and “norms,” compare note 2 in Part 1,
p.62). Assumptions can be either implicit (tacit) or
explicit (overtly declared). Explicit assumptions are
more conducive to reflective practice than implicit
ones, as they can be reflected and challenged by all
parties concerned. Implicit assumptions can be
made in three ways: (a) unintentionally, as they are
not seen by those making them; (b) consciously but
in an unreflecting way, as they are taken for
granted; or (c) consciously and deliberately, as the
ones making them are not interested in disclosing
them. Critical reflection and discourse aim first, at
uncovering (making explicit) implicit assumptions;
second, at unfolding the selectivity of all explicit
assumptions with regard to the facts and values they
exclude from consideration; third, at clarifying the
implications and practical consequences they may
have for the different parties concerned; and fourth,
at examining or challenging the validity claims
linked to these assumptions in the light of the
previous three requirements.

effort of uncovering and examining the
assumptions and claims involved. In order to
deal systematically with the presuppositions
and implications of specific information
system designs, we can thus climb the stairs
step by step, reflecting on the assumptions we
want to rely on and the validity claims they
imply, and then submitting the answers to
discursive validation by all parties concerned.
However, a crucial methodological
problem remains. We have noted earlier (in
Section 3) three fundamental barriers to
achieving complete rationality in discourses
about validity claims: First, consensus is a
scarce resource. Second, where consensus on
assumptions is effectively reached, it validates
these assumptions only to the extent that we
can assume that an ideal speech situation has
been approximated. Third, even where this is
feasible to a credible extent, there remains the
fundamental problem of boundary judgments.
Let me now turn to this much-neglected yet
crucial problem.
The problem of boundary judgments.
No argument can be completely rational in the
sense of justifying all the assumptions on
which it depends as well as all the
consequences it may have. What ought to
count as knowledge, that is, as relevant
circumstances, “facts” and “evidence” that
should be considered? And what counts as
relevant concerns, that is, value judgments
concerning purposes, measures of success and
other criteria of evaluation (“norms”)? Whose
facts and whose concerns should they
represent? Ultimately, there is no single right
way to decide such questions. Yet at some
point argumentation has to end and practical
action has to begin. Boundary judgments
define the boundaries of argumentation in two
interdependent ways: First, they delimit the
reference system that is considered relevant,
that is, the context that matters when it comes
to assessing the merits and defects of a claim.
In other words, they define what counts as
relevant knowledge and whose concerns are to
be considered as part of the problem.
Likewise, since both knowledge and concerns
always represent somebody’s facts and values,
boundary judgments also define the group of
people who are (or should be) involved in a
project or who, if not involved, are (should be)
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considered legitimate stakeholders. For
instance, what are the concerns that should
make up our notion of “improvement” for
redesigning and developing an existing IS,
whose concerns are they? Those parties whose
concerns define our standards of improvement
belong to the reference system in question.
Boundary judgments thus define what
knowledge is relevant and what concerns
matter.
Second, it follows that the boundary
judgments in question also define the range of
valid application of the arguments they
underpin. In the example, this would be the
precise context of implementation and use for
which the redesigned IS can claim to bring an
improvement. However, intentions (validity
claims) and actual achievements are not
always the same. It is thus always meaningful
and relevant to question the effective reference
system for which a proposal is valid. Not only
conscious decisions to treat some aspect of a
problem situation as not belonging to the
relevant context can and need to be interpreted
in terms of boundary judgments; rather, any
deficit of argumentation amounts to a
boundary judgment. For even if we are
perfectly willing to consider some aspect as
part of the problem, but then for whatever
reasons (e.g., lack of information, failures of
communication, errors of analysis or
argumentation) fail to consider it adequately,
we have effectively excluded this aspect from
our reference system.
I use the term “boundary judgments”
rather than “boundaries” to emphasize the
judgmental nature of boundary issues, for they
depend on assumptions of facts and values that
can always be questioned – there are no
objectively right or necessary ways to bound
the relevant context. I will discuss the specific
nature of the boundary issues in question in a
moment; at this point it is sufficient to note
that I am talking of multiple conceptual
systems boundaries rather than of a single
physical boundary.
It is hardly exaggerated to say that
everything that really matters in an ISD project
– what kind of “information” and “knowledge”
it is to provide for whom, in what context of
application, for what purposes and with a view
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to what kind of improvement – is heavily
dependent on boundary judgments. No effort
to argue comprehensively, as meaningful as it
may be, should make us forget that all
argumentation, all practice of applied science
and systems design, is selective in the sense of
depending on boundary judgments. The basic
implication is that we can never be sure of
having considered all possibly relevant facts
and normative considerations – one reason
why warrant design is such a difficult
undertaking. A second implication is that all
our claims are bound to be “partial” in the
sense of not doing equal justice to all concerns.
Reflective professional practice must face
these implications. No amount of science and
expertise can circumvent the problem of
boundary judgments.
Critical Systems Heuristics. In my
work on critical systems heuristics (CSH), or
more accurately, critical heuristics of social
systems design (see, e.g., Ulrich 1983, 1987a,
1993, 1996, 2000a, 2002a, b, and c), I have
sought to develop a discursive framework that
does justice to the problem of boundary
judgments and uses it as the starting point for a
critical systems approach to applied science,
systems design, and reflective practice in
general. Such a framework needs to meet two
basic requirements. First, it needs to clarify the
theoretical basis of a critical approach by
grounding it in semiotics, epistemology, and
practical philosophy. To this end, CSH relies
on ideas similar to the ones suggested in the
present paper but elaborates the philosophical
issues involved in much more detail, drawing
particularly on the writings of Kant (1781),
Peirce (1878), Popper (1959, 1963), Apel
(1980, 1981), Habermas (1979, 1984), and
Churchman (1971, 1979). Second, it needs to
translate this philosophical grounding into a
pragmatic (in the everyday sense of the term)
framework for reflective discursive practice.
CSH finds the key to this in a new, critical
understanding of the systems idea and in a
related attempt to secure a critical handling of
boundary judgments. The crucial idea consists
in a systematic process of boundary critique; I
will therefore begin my introduction to critical
heuristics with this idea.
Systematic
boundary
critique.
Boundary critique is the methodological core
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concept of critical systems heuristics.
Increasingly, it is also recognized as a central
concept of critical systems thinking and of
critical professional practice in general.
Boundary critique is a discursive process of
surfacing boundary judgments, unfolding their
implications, and examining the ways they
condition validity claims. This is what I call
boundary critique.
Let us be sure, then, that we understand
the fundamental nature and role of boundary
judgments. The first thing to understand is why
they are so fundamental. As my introductory
explanation should have made clear, from a
critical point of view the question is not
whether we rely on boundary judgments but
only how we handle them. Conventional
systems thinking may be understood as an
effort to expand our reference systems so that
ideally we might claim that we consider “the
whole relevant system” (Churchman 1971, p.
8).
Unfortunately,
this
sort
of
comprehensiveness is a claim reserved to
heroes and gods. From a critical point of view,

systems thinking cannot alter the fact that all
our claims remain selective in the double sense
explained above, of being selective with
respect to relevant facts and norms and partial
in the sense of benefiting some parties more
than others. Boundary critique aims at
disclosing this inevitable selectivity and
partiality.
How boundary judgments work. The
second essential point we need to understand is
how boundary judgments work. How exactly
do they condition our reference system and the
claims that may depend on it? CSH explains
this by means of the eternal triangle of
reference system, facts, and values: Whenever
we propose a problem definition or solution,
we cannot help but assert the relevance of
some facts and norms as distinguished from
others. Which facts and norms we should
consider depends on how we bound the
reference system, and vice-versa; as soon as
we modify our boundary judgments, relevant
facts and norms are likely to change, too
(Figure 4).

Figure 4: The “eternal triangle” of boundary judgments, observations, and evaluations
(Source: Ulrich 2000a, p. 252)

Thinking through the triangle means to
consider each of its corners in the light of the
other two. For example, what new facts
become relevant if we expand the boundaries
of the reference system or modify our value
judgments? How do our valuations look if we
consider new facts that refer to a modified

reference system? In what way may our
reference system fail to do justice to the
perspective of different stakeholder groups?
Any claim that does not reflect on this
“triangle” of boundary judgments, judgments
of facts, and value judgments, risks claiming
too much, by not disclosing its built-in
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selectivity. In this way boundary judgments
strongly influence the way we “see” a
situation. It is thus never a bad idea to make it
clear to ourselves and to others what these
judgments are and how different the situation
might look if we were to change them. I see
much potential here for employing the systems
idea in more self-critical ways than is
common; in ways that truly promote selfreflection, learning, openness, and tolerance
toward others. Mutual understanding need not
always mean consensus; we can learn to
understand our differences rationally, by
appreciating one another’s different reference
systems and granting to each other that there is
no single right set of boundary assumptions.
This, it seems to me, is a definitive gain in
communicative rationality, even where
consensus is not available or does not live up
to ideal conditions of rationality.
Boundary categories. The next point
the reader will want to understand is how we

can
identify
boundary
assumptions
systematically. What types or categories of
boundary issues are there, how do the
boundary judgments in question look like?
CSH offers a framework of twelve basic
boundary categories (Figure 5). Each category
stands for a type of boundary issue that
unavoidably comes up in all systems design
and practice. What matters is not so much the
specific terms I propose for the categories but
rather their intent, that is, the specific
boundary issues they address. There are four
groups of boundary issues. They refer to a
claim’s
sources
of
motivation
and
purposefulness; of power and control; of
knowledge and expertise; and of legitimation
and normative acceptability. The first category
of each group refers to a key group of actors
concerned; the second to related core concerns;
and the third to crucial difficulties raised by
the two previous issues.

Figure 5: Boundary categories of critical systems heuristics
(Source: W. Ulrich, 1983, p. 258; 1996, p. 43; and 2000a, p. 256)

In any concrete situation, assumptions
concerning these twelve boundary issues make
up the reference system we use for defining
“the problem” or assessing the merits and
deficiencies
of
any
proposals
for
“improvement” (e.g., a solution proposal,
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design, evaluation, recommendation, decision,
and so on). Since a claim’s underpinning
reference system is so fundamental to
understanding its meaning and validity, we can
use the twelve boundary categories as guides
for reflecting about many issues that pose
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themselves in ISD projects. We may use them
for a general assessment of a design or project
as a whole, for instance when we face
conflicting expectations and concerns of the
different parties involved or affected. We may
equally use them as guides in dealing with
particular questions that come up in a project,
or we can use them to surface such questions
in the first place. In all these applications, we
will want to examine boundary assumptions in
the light of those steps of the philosophical
staircase that appear particularly relevant for
clarifying the claims involved. Obviously,
before we can do so we need to familiarize
ourselves with the intent of the boundary
categories and learn to use them for
formulating relevant questions – the next step.
Boundary questions. The boundary
categories can be translated into a checklist of
critical boundary questions (Ulrich 1987a,
1993, 1996, 2000). I have formulated these so
that they should make clear the intent of each
boundary category; the second part of each
question (beginning with “That is, …”) gives a
definition of that category. For each boundary
category there are two questions, one
formulated in the “is” mode (what is actually
the case?), the other in the “ought” mode (what
should ideally be the case?). Only by opposing
“is” and “ought” answers can we fully
appreciate the selectivity of the boundary
judgments concerned; differences between “is”
and “ought” answers (which are frequent)
point to unresolved boundary issues (Table 4).
I suggest we use boundary questions for three
critical purposes:
•

First, to identify and unfold systematically
the boundary issues raised by a claim –
What boundary judgments are actually
underpinning
the
claim
(“is”
assumptions), as distinguished from those
I or we (those involved) would like to rely
on (“ought” assumptions)? What is their
empirical and normative selectivity, whose
concerns do they reflect?

•

Second, to address concerns other than
those privileged by the present situation –
What are the boundary judgments in terms
of which we can understand the concerns
of different groups of stakeholders? What
options are there for adapting the assumed

reference systems so as to accommodate
these concerns? How different would the
claim in question then look?
•

Third, to identify and challenge in a
compelling way any claims to knowledge
and rationality that do not declare their
underpinning boundary judgments – What
boundary judgments does this claim take
for granted? Whose concerns do these
boundary judgments treat as irrelevant or
marginal, and what does that tell us about
the selectivity of the claims linked to
them?

Emancipatory boundary critique.
The last-mentioned guideline leads to an
emancipatory employment of boundary
critique. Lest boundary critique depend
entirely on the goodwill of those involved,
anyone who has understood the basic idea can
also use boundary critique against parties who
are not willing to handle their boundary
judgments so self-critically. This is an
important application of boundary critique; it
means that unlike Habermas’ ideal model of
discourse, CSH does not depend on the
anticipation of an ideal speech situation in
which influence, power and skills are
distributed symmetrically and all participants
are willing to rely on no force but that of the
stronger argument. Boundary critique puts
people whose concerns have been ignored or
marginalized in a situation in which they can
translate their concerns into cogent critical
argumentation. They can now make it apparent
to everyone (also publicly) how the arguments
of those in control of the situation depend on
boundary judgments that have not been
declared. By advancing alternative boundary
judgments that may be overtly subjective, they
can demonstrate that there are options, and in
this way can also make apparent the intrinsic
selectivity and partiality of the claims they
contest. Since boundary judgments cannot be
justified by reference to an advantage of
theoretical expertise and knowledge, anyone
can use them for critical purposes without
running the risk of being convicted of
insufficient expertise or competence. In this
way, emancipatory boundary critique can help
create a new symmetry of critical competence
under everyday conditions of asymmetric
influence and incomplete rationality.
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Table 4: Boundary questions of critical systems heuristics
(Source: W. Ulrich, 1987, p. 279; 1996, pp. 24-31; and 2000a, p. 258)
Sources of Motivation
(1)
(2)
(3)

Who is (ought to be) the client? That is, whose interests are (should be) served?
What is (ought to be) the purpose? That is, what are (should be) the consequences?
What is (ought to be) the measure of improvement? That is, how can (should) we
determine whether and in what way the consequences, taken together, constitute an
improvement?
Sources of Power
(4) Who is (ought to be) the decision maker? That is, who is (should be) in a position to change
the measure of improvement?
(5) What resources are (ought to be) controlled by the decision maker? That is, what conditions
of success can (should) those involved control?
(6) What conditions are (ought to be) part of the environment? That is, what conditions does
(should) the decision maker not control (e.g., from the viewpoint of those not involved)?
Sources of Knowledge
(7) Who is (ought to be) involved as a professional? That is, who is (should be) involved as an
expert, e.g., as a system designer, researcher, or consultant?
(8) What expertise is (ought to be) consulted? That is, what counts (should count) as relevant
knowledge?
(9) What or who is (ought to be) assumed to be the guarantor? That is, what is (should) be
considered a source of guarantee (e.g., consensus among experts, stakeholder involvement,
support of decision-makers, etc.)?
Sources of Legitimation
(10) Who is (ought to be) witness to the interests of those affected but not involved? That is, who
is (should be) treated as legitimate stakeholder, and who argues (should argue) the case of
those stakeholders who cannot speak for themselves, including the handicapped, the
unborn, and non-human nature?
(11) What secures (ought to secure) the emancipation of those affected from the premises and
promises of those involved? That is, where does (should) legitimacy lie?
(12) What world view is (ought to be) determining? That is, what different visions of
improvement are (should be) considered and somehow reconciled?

In addition to creating better
argumentative chances for those who are
willing to submit their claims to argumentation
(as against those who are not so willing),
emancipatory boundary critique also allows
discourse participants to analyze their
differences in terms of divergent reference
systems rather than accusing one another of
lacking rationality or of getting their facts or
values wrong. In this way, people can at least
agree about why they disagree, and can so
better appreciate the different rationalities of
those with whom they are at cross-purposes
(sic – boundary category #2). I cannot explain
this emancipatory side of critical systems
heuristics in any more detail here but invite the
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reader to consult some of the original sources
(Ulrich, 1983, entire Ch. 5; 1987, p. 281f;
1993, pp. 599-605; 2000a, pp. 257-260).
Contrasting two types of reference
systems. CSH distinguishes between two basic
reference systems that can help us grasp the
intrinsic selectivity of a system design. The
first is the one that actually informs the design
effort of those involved; it represents their
primary system of concern and hence, their
basic context of justification. The second is a
larger context that includes all the effects that a
claim may possibly impose on third parties,
including those stakeholders whose concerns
may not be represented by the primary system
of concern. CSH conceives of this larger
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context as a claim’s context of application. In
order to fully appreciate the selectivity of a
design, we should try to understand both
reference systems. For critical purposes, it is a
good idea to maintain a critical tension
between them: each can help us to see the
other in a critical light. Both the primary
system of concern and the context of
application can of course be unfolded
systematically by means of the boundary
categories and questions.
Critically systemic discourse. I call
the suggested discursive framework critically
systemic discourse, for it marries the ideas of
critical systems thinking and discourse in a
mutually supportive manner:
•

•

On the one hand, systemic boundary
critique renders critical discourse cogent
without requiring ideal conditions of
complete rationality. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the only model of
discourse today that achieves this. It
allows discursive examination of validity
claims without depending for its
rationality on ideally rational consensus,
that is, on a condition that in practice is
illusory. Critically systemic discourse
does not sacrifice rational discursive
practice to such a theoretical concept of
rational discourse. It renounces a onesided focus on consensus as a source of
reasonable practice in favor of a sustained
effort to deal critically with the fact that
under everyday conditions we can hardly
ever assume conditions of complete
rationality. The point of rational discourse
is then to deal critically with conditions of
incomplete rationality and thus to create
more practical rationality, rather than
presupposing it. This kind of discourse is
about being (self-) critical rather than
being right. This is the “critical turn” of
rationality that I advocate. Boundary
discourse is my proposal for practicing the
critical turn. Insofar as it creates improved
symmetry of critical competence, it
pragmatizes the ideal speech situation in a
critically tenable way.
On the other hand, boundary discourse
also operationalizes the basic idea of
critical systems thinking, of using systems

thinking in the service of reflective
practice. Note that the systems idea is
similarly ideal in its quest for
comprehensiveness in looking at a
problem as is the idea of achieving
complete justification of claims by means
of discourse. Boundary critique thus not
only improves chances for cogent
argumentation – at least for critical
purposes – under everyday conditions of
imperfect rationality, it is also the only
way systems thinking can be critically
tenable.
In view of this double capacity of
making critical discourse practicable and
systems thinking critically tenable, I suggest
that boundary critique is a methodological
core idea for any discursive approach to
reflective practice. Thus far, systems designers
were facing an impossible choice between a
discursive framework such as the one of
Habermas, which is critically tenable but not
practicable, or a more conventional
monological framework as represented by
prevailing notions of applied science and
expertise (including systems science and
systems methodologies), which are practicable
but not critically tenable – and for this reason
also fail to promote reflective practice.
Critically systemic discourse offers a way out
of this dilemma; its concept of rational
discourse is both critically tenable and
practicable. It stands for a conception of
systems thinking and systems design that is
fundamentally discursive and thus offers a
radical alternative to the prevailing
understanding of critical systems thinking in
terms of informed methodology choice, an
approach that I have elsewhere examined in
detail and found methodologically incapable of
supporting reflective practice (see Ulrich
2000b and 2002c; shorter in 2001, p.19f).
As a final comment, it is only natural
that new ideas of the kind I have presented
appear somewhat abstract and theoretical as
long as they are not yet familiar. I can assure
the reader, however, that boundary critique is
anything but an abstract theoretical idea.
Boundary judgments are not an exotic
invention of mine; rather, they are omnipresent
out there in the world of social practice. Once
you have understood the concept, you will see
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boundary judgments at work in your
professional life every day and you will hear
them playing their part in discussions
everywhere, whether in the media or on the
bus. People use them all the time without
being aware of them and of how they condition
what they say. A discursive framework such as
critically systemic discourse is required to
change the situation and to render the concept
useful for reflective practice.

8

APPLICATION

Some recommendations. Returning at
the end of this paper to the field of ISD, I
would like to summarize the key ideas outlined
in the paper in the form of three basic
recommendation or guidelines for ISD
professionals who wish to become more
reflective practitioners:

1. Conceive of reflective practice in terms of
the philosophical staircase for ISD, that
is, examine the validity claims
underpinning any specific design or use of
an IS by climbing the staircase step for
step and reflecting on the questions each
step may raise.

2. Familiarize yourself with the idea of
systematic boundary critique as it has
been conceptualized and pragmatized in
critical systems heuristics.

3. Engage in critically systemic discourse
with both colleagues involved in and
stakeholders concerned by an ISD project
on which you work, and start applying the
idea of discursive boundary critique – of
boundary discourse – to all or selected
steps of the staircase.
For some further guidelines and an
example of their application, although not to
an ISD problem, see Ulrich (2000a, pp. 260264). Some more detailed case studies from
various fields of application can be found in
Ulrich (1981; 1983, chapters 7 and 8); Flood &
Jackson (1991); Topp (1995); Midgley et al.
(1998); and Carr and Levidow (2000). Finally,
some recent attempts at applying the idea of
boundary critique to ISD can be found in two
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papers and a forthcoming dissertation by
Cordoba and collaborators (Cordoba 2002,
Cordoba et al. 2000a, b)3. To conclude the
present paper, I would like to give a short
account of Cordoba’s approach; I will then
modify it slightly so that it can help the reader
to concretize the three recommendations just
given and to put them into practice.
A practical application. Cordoba starts
from the observation that much of present-day
IS planning is based on an instrumental and
strategic kind of rationality – in his words,
“technological and business driven” and
focusing on increasing “maximum turnover of
investments made” or providing “competitive
advantage.” His concern is that this sort of
approach is particularly inadequate for
developing countries, where IT and IS are
considered as vital tools for “catching up” with
other countries; being part of the global
Information Society is seen as a fast track
towards
improvements
in
education,
employment, social conditions of life, and
democracy. However, practice does not always
live up to these expectations. Cordoba refers to
recent efforts in Columbia (a country whose
citizen he is and with which he is therefore
familiar) to establish a national plan for the use
of IT and IS with a view to improving access
to information and communication services for
large parts of the population. He observes that
two years after the plan was established, it has
not been fully implemented and has achieved
little progress in making information services
more accessible to people. For instance, “vast
rural areas still remain isolated from the rest of
the country. Internet connections will only
increase from 500.000 now to 1.2 millions in
2002. Plans to massively use IS in education
[by providing schools with Internet access]

3

I have some reservations about the account of
my understanding of boundary critique in Cordoba
et al. (2000b). This account, though partly correct,
follows a number of previous misrepresentations of
my work by one of Cordoba’s co-authors (e.g.
Midgley et al. 1998); for this reason I prefer to refer
the reader to Cordoba et al. (2000a), as this papers
offers a shorter but more adequate account of my
ideas. For authentic recent introductions, see Ulrich
(1996, 2000a, 2001, 2002a, b, c).
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in mind, Cordoba turned to the idea of
boundary critique as the core concept of his
approach to IS planning in Columbia. He
reports on an ISD project aimed at supporting
teaching and research at Javeriana University
in Bogotá in which he was involved. To help
define IT/IS requirements in a way that should
respond to the needs of staff and students, he
designed the methodology summarized in
Figure 6. My subsequent account follows
Cordoba’s (2000a) closely.

find resistance among teachers and educational
institutions.” (Cordoba et al., 2000a, p. 4).
The story certainly looks familiar to
anyone who has ever participated in projects
directed at improving particular social
conditions and has observed how issues of
social systems design are treated as mere
issues of “tool design” (Ulrich 1981, p. 36, and
1983, p. 329): the myth that “better technology
can help solve practical problems” is
apparently immune against all practical failure
(Lyytinen and Robey 1999). With this concern

Concerns, values and assumptions of
ideas, plans and initiatives to improve way of life

Distinction
Boundaries
Boundary
Critique

Concerns
Boundaries
Improvement

Action plans (including ICTP)

Figure 6: A discursive framework for boundary critique as used in Columbia
by Cordoba et al. (2000a, b)
The methodology consisted of two
stages of discourse. First, a stage of
distinction was used to identify the different
concerns of people as they voiced them.
Second, a stage of improvement was used in
which
specific
improvements
were
presented to the participants to see whether
some of them captured their concerns and
could be transformed into concrete action
with or without IS. The conceptual link
between the two stages consisted in
boundary critique. The idea was to make
sure no issues, people, or activities were
excluded or marginalized in the process.
This was achieved by applying the
boundary questions of critical systems

heuristics to both the concerns identified and to
the proposals for improvement. Questions such as
“who else should be included” or “what else
should be included,” specified for particular
boundary categories, were driving the process of
debate with the participants. Posing the questions
in the “ought” as opposed to the “is” mode
allowed participants to reflect on other aspects
that should be addressed, beyond their original
concerns.
Facilitators
also
encouraged
participants to reflect on the relevant sources of
knowledge that should be used in the process,
including
new
participants
and
new
methodologies. In order to keep the process of
pushing out the boundaries manageable, some
practical limits were predefined in terms of
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feasible actions within the University,
financial constraints, and others. These
imposed boundaries were, however,
acknowledged and thus considered more
consciously than they might have been
without the process of boundary critique. I
should mention here that my own
understanding of boundary critique,
including ecological and ethical boundary
critique, does not imply that the process is
always oriented to pushing out system
boundaries; when it comes to critical
systems
thinking,
bigger
is
not
automatically better (see Ulrich 1993, p.
583-585; 1996, pp. 36f; 2001, p. 23).

“information,” “knowledge,” and “rationality”:
1.

What counts as adequate information and to
whom is it to be provided by the information
system in question? (Semiotic clarification &
critique, steps 1 - 3 of the staircase)

2.

How is the IS embedded in a larger context
that makes sure users and other actors will be
in a situation to base their actions on valid
knowledge? (Epistemological validation &
critique, steps 4-6)

3.

Wherein consists the rationality of the
practice thus supported, that is, what
concept(s) of rationality and what
corresponding concepts of improvement does
it assume and whose rationality does it stand
for? (Practical-philosophical rationalization,
steps 7-9)

In Cordoba’s evaluation of the
experience,
“The approach allowed the emergence
of issues not addressed by traditional
methodologies
of
IS
planning.
Particularly it helped to identify the
assumptions that people have regarding
the purpose and usefulness of IS. It also
helped to identify the concerns of those
who are in charge. … Asking about
concerns seems to be a useful element
to facilitate inclusion of people and
issues into actions. … In this way IS
planning can become a continuous
dialogue in the creation of knowledge
and meaning.” (Cordoba et al., 2000a,
p. 7)

An improved three-stage model
for critically systemic discourse. In my
own evaluation, the reported application of
boundary critique seems to come close in
many respects to what I intend by critically
systemic discourse, except that in this case
the issue of uncovering the validity claims
involved does not appear to have been a
major concern, as of course the process was
not informed by the philosophical staircase.
In any case I would suggest modifying the
process slightly, so as to give a systematic
place to the idea of a discursive examination
of validity claims, particularly as implied by
mutual understanding on improvement. In
what way are the claims to improvement
selective? Following the logic of the
staircase, claims to improvement might be
systematically analyzed in terms of
underpinning
assumptions
regarding
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Systems designers and facilitators might
formulate pertinent questions in the language
previously used by the participants and ask them,
as well as possibly third parties not previously
involved, to comment on these questions before
defining the basic assumptions on which the IS
design is to be based.
How should the additional scrutiny be
located in the process? It could be understood as
an implicit part of boundary critique, which
means criticizing validity claims in both stages
according to Figure 6, or it could be assigned to
an additional third stage that logically would
have to follow the second. I think the second
solution is easier to put into practice, for the
following reasons.
•

It does not burden the first stage of
identifying the concerns of stakeholders with
the more difficult issue of examining validity
claims; it thus offers more flexibility for
adapting the important first stage to the needs
and language of the participants.

•

The entire process is meant to crystallize into
some proposals for action – I will call them
“conclusions” – with a view to achieving
improvement. It makes sense to focus the
scrutiny of validity claims on the notion of
“improvement” that is to guide further action.
(Note that the quest for improvement is a
core
concept
that
orients
CSH’s
categorization of boundary issues and thus its
understanding of boundary critique; see, e.g.,
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Ulrich 1983, pp. 236-239, 294 and
254f; 1996, pp. 7-10; and 2001, p. 8f).
•

A separate third stage makes allowance
for the possibility that in stage 2, no
consensus
on
proposals
for
improvement is reached. The final
stage can then help participants
understand why this is so and

appreciate the conflicting rationalities and
claims involved. On this basis of mutual
understanding of differences, a new respect
and tolerance can grow that may be
conducive to finding some common ground
for action.
The resulting three-stage model of
critically systemic discourse is shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7: A three-stage model of critically systemic discourse

The description of the process of
boundary discourse in terms of three stages (or
two in the case of Cordoba’s report) should of
course be read as indicating a logical rather
than a temporal order. During the entire
process, participants should be allowed to
reconsider the concerns they voiced originally,
as well as the improvements they recognized
as appropriate or refuted, particularly when it
comes to unfolding the selectivity of implied
validity claims. In the light of issues related to
validity claims, it may well be that previously
defined concerns and conclusions regarding

“improvement” need to be reconsidered. The
figure makes the iterative nature of the process
obvious.
As a final note concerning the
implementation
of
critically
systemic
discourse, I would not exclude that it can also
be usefully supported by appropriate software,
and in this way could become an integral part
of an interactive IS design. In this respect, I
would like to refer the reader to Ivanov’s
pertinent,
though
rather
preliminary,
reflections on the design of computer
supported learning through what he calls
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“hypersystems,” an interactive software
application (possibly in the form of
groupware) that would elicit and help to record
an argumentative process structured along
basic categories such as CSH’s boundary
categories (Forsgren and Ivanov 1990; Ivanov
1992 and 1993).
Conclusion. With this three-stage
model, we have concluded the outline of a
discursive approach to reflective practice in
ISD that incorporates the critical turn. The
approach has thus three main elements:
1.

The philosophical staircase of ISD – a
guide to identifying, and reflecting upon,
the validity claims raised by a concrete
ISD project (or by any specific aspect of
its design).

2.

Critically systemic discourse – a
discursive framework for examining
validity claims that operationalizes the
methodological core concept of systematic
boundary critique.

3.

A three-stage model of critically systemic
discourse – a practical way of applying
boundary critique to the three issues of
identifying the concerns of stakeholders;
drawing conclusions concerning possible
proposals for “improvement”; and
examining the validity claims embodied in
such proposals in terms of their empirical
and normative selectivity.
I wish you good reflective practice.
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